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The Unconventional Equal Protection

Jurisprudence of Jury Selection
JOEL

H. SwiFt

°

INTRODUCTION

In the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,' striking down
racially motivated peremptory challenges, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting,
asserts that the holding "sets aside the peremptory challenge." 2 Justice
Marshall, in his concurring opinion, laments the fact that the decision does
not do that which the Chief Justice predicts.3 Commentary following
Batson and its progeny,4 has continued this theme, with each new decision

* B.A., Wagner; J.D., LL.M., University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of
Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
The author is grateful to Patrick Costello and Steve Dalton for background research,
and to Angela Higgins Thuma for several helpful memoranda. The greatest thanks, however,
goes to Elizabeth Shannon who, in addition to helping with the bulk of the research, made
good use of her military experience as Senior Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge to
guarantee that the article was finished.
This article was supported in part by a grant from the Northern Illinois University
College of Law.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate the
equal protection rights of both criminal defendants and challenged jurors).
2. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The decision today will not end the
racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.").
4. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant, regardless
of his or her race, has standing to object to prosecutors' race-based peremptory challenges
of potential jurors); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that unless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in a prosecutor's explanation for his or her exercise of a
peremptory challenge, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that a private litigant in a civil case
is a state actor for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause and therefore may not use
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenge is state
action for purposes of Equal Protection Clause); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct.
1419 (1994) (finding that gender-based peremptory challenges of potential jurors by state
actors violates the Equal Protection Clause).
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touching off predictions that the peremptory challenge cannot or should not

survive this latest incursion.'

The bulk of these challenges to the continuing vitality of the peremptory challenge relies on the application of conventional equal protection
doctrine to the particular issue. With regard to both issues of equal
protection doctrine raised in the jury selection process--the requirement of
proof of purpose or intent to discriminate, 6 and the application of standards
of review, 7 commentators seem convinced that logical analysis of conventional doctrine must lead to the eventual demise of the peremptory
challenge. Indeed, similar arguments have been made with regard to the
non-equal protection constitutional issues of state action s and third party

5. See Melissa C. Hinton, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Has Batson Been
Stretched Too Far?57 Mo. L. Rev. 569 (1992); Sherrie J. O'Brien, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B.: The Collapse of the Peremptory Challenge, 14 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 655
(1995); Frederick V. Olson, Note, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Reasoned or ResultOrientedJurisprudence?, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 497 (1992).
6. See infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
7. See Anna M. Scruggs, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Strike Two for the
Peremptory Challenge, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 549 (1995); Susan A. Winchurch, Note, J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: The Supreme Court Moves Closer to Elimination of the Peremptory
Challenge, 54 MD. L. REV. 261 (1995); Eric N. Einhom, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 161 (1994).
8. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires that criminal defendants provide race-neutral explanations for
striking potential jurors if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial discrimination
by the criminal defendants in their peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 643 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that a private litigant's
exercise of peremptory challenge in a civil trial is state action). Justice O'Connor, dissenting
in McCollum, points out that under the majority's approach "criminal defendants being
prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their adversary when they exercise peremptory
challenges during jury selection." McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62.
Commentators argue that the McCollum and Edmondson decisions have significantly
undermined the role of the peremptory challenge in American jurisprudence. Robert T. Prior,
The Peremptory Challenge:A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER L. REV. 579, 595 (1993) (stating that
the Court's decisions over the past six years regarding peremptory challenges indicate that,
in jury selection cases, the Equal Protection Clause will "trump" the peremptory challenge
and that this trend may ultimately lead to its demise); Michael J. Desmond, Note, Limiting
a Defendant'sPeremptory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum and the Problematic Extension
of Equal Protection,42 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 412 (1993) (positing that the Court's reliance
on the Equal Protection Clause in McCollum "extends that doctrine into a problematic area
of dubious state action," thus threatening the existence of the peremptory challenge); Deborah
Zalesne & Kinney Zalense, Saving the Peremptory Challenge: The Case for a Narrow
Interpretationof McCollum, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 313 (1993); Hinton, supra note 5; Olson,
supra note 5.
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standing. 9 For the most part, these commentators are either clearly or
arguably correct. To the extent that the Supreme Court has addressed these
issues, on the other hand, the doomsayers have been proved wrong, at least
in the result. In the interaction between the Equal Protection Clause and
jury selection, the Court, in fact, has traveled an erratic and conflicting line.
At times it has protected discretionary judgments at the expense of equal
treatment, and at times it has demanded equality of treatment that is
inconsistent with the exercise of discretion in the selection of juries.' 0 In
the process, a good deal of unconventional equal protection analysis has
taken place."
The practice of applying unique equal protection jurisprudence to jury
selection, of course, did not start with Batson. Part II of this article will
examine over a century of "purposeful discrimination" cases and will
demonstrate that conventional doctrine has not been applicable to the
determination of whether a challenger to a selection process has made out
a prima facie case, or to the rebuttal of a prima facie case. Part III will
examine the other major peremptory challenge issue, the identification of
individuals protected by the Equal Protection Clause from the arbitrary or
generalized exercise of the peremptory challenge.
I. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND ITS REBUTTAL

A. THE IMPACT OF IMPACT

With two exceptions, conventional equal protection doctrine holds that
a government classification which disproportionately affects a particular
group, even a traditionally disadvantaged group, does not, in itself, establish
an equal protection violation. While impact may be a relevant factor in
determining whether the purpose of the government action was to negatively
9. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). See also Bradley R. Kirk, Milking the
New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds
in Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 PEPP. L. REV. 691 (1992);
Michael A. Cressler, Comment, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell for the Peremptory
Challenge?, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 349 (1991-92). But see Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right is it Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725
(1992).
10. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (applying
conventional equal protection analysis to the peremptory challenge is held to be impossible).
See infra, Parts II and Ill.
11. Id.
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affect the disadvantaged group, doctrinally it is not enough, standing alone,
to prove a violation.
In Washington v. Davis 2 the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
argument that "the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under
Title VII . . ..",3 Under Title VII,14 of course, a statistical demonstration
of disproportionate impact is sufficient to establish a statutory violation.'"
Relying initially on several quotations from jury selection cases,' 6 the
Davis court stated that one claiming an equal protection violation must
prove, independently of or in conjunction with the result, 7 that the purpose
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. Id. at 239.
14. Civil Rights Act §§ 701 et. seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1964). An employer
may not "limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities... because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."
15. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Any hiring practice
that disqualifies a disproportionate number of blacks is prohibited, unless it can be justified
as a "business necessity." Congress placed the burden on the employer to rebut the prima
facie case with proof that an employment practice which has a disproportionate impact is a
"business necessity." Id. at 431-32.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) modified Griggs by
permitting the employer to rebut the prima facie case simply with an assertion of a raceneutral "business necessity" and thereafter placing the burden on the complainant to persuade
the Court that the employer's business justification for his employment practice failed, in a
significant way, the legitimate goals of the employer. Merrick Rossein, Disparate Impact
Theory after the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Restoring the Job Performance Standard, 429
PLI/LIT 155 (Feb. 5, 1992).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 substantially overruled Wards Cove, requiring the
complaining party to demonstrate that the employer "uses a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin..
•." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1982). Robert A. Robertson, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: Congress Provides Guidelines for Title VII Disparate hnpact Cases, 3 GEO. MASON
U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 16 (1992). Generally, a determination of disparate impact will be made
using statistical evidence. Id. at 61. If a prima facie case is established, and the employer
fails to rebut the complaining party's statistical showing, then the employer must demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with "business necessity." Id. at 62.
16. "A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic
exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to
such an extent as to show intentional discrimination." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976) (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)); "A defendant in a
criminal case is entitled to require that the State not deliberately and systematically deny to
members of his race the right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice." Id. at
239 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1972)).
17. Several ways in which such independent proof could be established were set forth
in the Court's opinion in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
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or intent of the government was to bring about the disproportionately
negative impact on the disadvantaged group."8 Indeed, subsequently in
Massachusetts Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,'9 the Court stated that
even if the government actor, in this case the legislature, was fully aware
that its classifying action would have a substantially disproportionate impact
on a protected group, purposeful discrimination was not shown unless the
complaining party proved the legislature had adopted the law "because of"
and not merely "in spite of' 20 its effect on that group. 2'
The Davis court recognized two exceptions to the general rule as stated.
The first exception derived from Yick Wo v. Hopkins,22 where a discretionary function by a public official resulted in the total exclusion of individuals
of a cognizable national group.23 The Davis Court described Yick Wo as
holding that "[a] statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied
'
The second
so as to invidiously discriminate on the basis of race."24
selection of
in
the
discrimination
racial
with
exception was "cases dealing
''
25
As a consequence of this latter exception, ten years after Davis,
juries.
when the Court considered the burden of proving racial discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges, it expressly stated that decisions
concerning the prima facie case necessary to establish a violation of Title
VII were applicable to claims of purposeful racial discrimination in jury
selection.26 It is to the cases under which this exception developed, and

(1977):

The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source,
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes.... The specific sequence or events leading up to the challenged
decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's purpose....
Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence
that the improper purposes are playing a role.
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant,
especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.
Id. at 267-68.
18. Id. at 270.

19. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).

20. Id. at 279.
21. Id.

22. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
23.
24.
25.
26.
'disparate
operation

Id. at 368-69.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
Id.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986). ("Our decisions concerning
treatment' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the
of prima facie burden of proof rules.").
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the role which disproportionate impact has played in the finding of
intentional discrimination, to which we shall now turn.
1. The Foundation Cases
The basic principles of the interaction between jury selection and the
Equal Protection Clause were established in a series of five cases decided
between 1879 and 1883. The first three, Strauder v. West Virginia,27
Virginia v. Rives,28 and Ex parte Virginia, were decided together.
Strauder and Rives involved petitions by criminal defendants to have their
prosecutions removed from state to federal court pursuant to Section 641 of
the Revised Statutes,30 which authorized such removal at any time before
trial if the defendant established that he "is denied, or cannot enforce, in the

judicial tribunals of the State . . . any right secured to him by any law

providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States."' Ex
parte Virginia involved a challenge by a Virginia state court judge to a
federal criminal prosecution under a statute prohibiting discrimination on
account of race by "any officer or other person charged with any duty in the
32
selection or summoning of jurors.
In Strauder, the Court explained that "in regard to the colored race, for
whose protection the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was primarily designed, that
no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color." 3 At that time, West Virginia law limited jury service to "white
male persons, 34 and the West Virginia courts had given no indication that
they intended to apply the Equal Protection Clause to such laws.3 5 After
observing that the question presented was whether "in the composition or
selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of
[defendant's] race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their
race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the
jury, 36 the Court concluded that the West Virginia statute denied the
defendant a "right secured to him by [any] law providing for the equal civil
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
29. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).

30. Rev. Stat. § 641 (1878).
31. Id.
32. Act of Mar. 1 1875, Dec. 4, § 3, 18 Stat. 336; 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879).

33. 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).

34. Id. at 304.
35. Id. at 309-10.
36. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).
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rights of citizens of the United States. . . ."3 and that he was unable to
enforce this federal right in the state's courts. 3' Removal to federal court
was thus authorized by Section 641.
Although the facts of Strauder had involved a statute, the Court
suggested that its holding might not be so limited, stating "any State action
that denies this immunity to a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution. 3 9 Virginia v. Rives,4° however, immediately placed the first limitation on the ability to enforce Strauder. Considering a procedural issue in
Rives, the Court limited the removal authority to Strauder cases, where the
legislature had expressly excluded blacks from juries, reasoning that as long
as state law did not prohibit blacks from serving on juries the defendant
could not know until the trial began whether his rights would be denied.41
The Rives Court also rejected the defendant's motion that the venire from
which his jury was to be selected be modified from all white to one-third
black, holding that the defendant had no right to have members of his race
selected but only the right not to have them excluded.42 Finally, in Ex
parte Virginia, the Supreme Court denied habeas relief to the state court
judge, holding the federal criminal prohibition was a valid exercise of
Congress' power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 3
The distinction between a right to prevent exclusion and a right to
demand inclusion drawn by Rives lay at the heart of Justice Field's
disagreement with the opinions in Strauder and Ex parte Virginia.44 His
opinion in the latter sought to apply what was to become, in Washington v.
Davis,45 conventional equal protection doctrine--that more than disproportionate impact (total exclusion) was necessary to establish purposeful
discrimination. 46 Justice Field asserted that there was no proof of discrimination in Ex parte Virginia and that the indictment against the state court
judge could be valid only if "it was to be presumed that his failure to [ever
The
put colored persons on the jury lists] was because of their race ....
',4

Id. at 311 (citing Rev. Stat. § 641 (1878)).
Id.
Id. at 310.
100 U.S. 313 (1879).
Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 323.
100 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1879). There does not appear to have been another instance
this federal criminal statute was enforced, although racial discrimination in jury
was subsequently found in numerous cases.
See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 365 (Field, J., dissenting).
45. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
46. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 349-70 (Field, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 353.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
in which
selection
44.
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effect, said Justice Field, is that an allegation of nothing more than "the
general failure to put colored persons on the jury list--a fact which could not
be disputed "4" placed the burden on the accused judge to prove that no
person of the colored race in the county was qualified (a burden which
presumably could not be met).49 Justice Field also argued that the federal
statute assumed that whites could not be fair and honest jurors in cases
involving colored people.50 If that were true, then it logically followed that
in such cases all of the jurors must be of the colored race. 51 Consequently,
a prohibition on exclusion and a requirement of inclusion could not be
distinguished.
The following year the Court considered Neal v. Delaware,52 which
both limited and strengthened the right recognized in Strauder. The
limitation this time was substantive--the establishment of a presumption of
state compliance with its obligation to conform to the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, even if its own constitution was inconsistent
therewith, a presumption that was rendered conclusive if the state courts had
expressly struck down the offending provision and there had been no
legislative effort to revive it.53 The Court did express a caveat, however,
that had the legislature made such an effort or had the state's courts
repudiated Strauder, removal would have been proper.54 Nonetheless, the
presumption of compliance, in the absence of express rejection of Strauder,
made enforcement of Strauder still more difficult.
The strengthening came about through reversal of the denial of a
motion to quash the indictment. Petitioner alleged, the state acknowledged,
and the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that no black had ever
been summoned as a juror in Delaware.55 For the first time, the Supreme
Court engaged in statistical analysis, 56 pointing out that of less than
150,000 state citizens, the colored population of Delaware exceeded 20,000
in 1870 and 26,000 in 1880."7 These statistics were held sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful exclusion, shifting the burden to

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.

52. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
53. Id. at 386.
54. Id. at 392.

55. Id. at 397.
56. See generally Michael 0. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision
Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966).
57. Neal, 103 U.S. at 397.
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the state to rebut.58
Once again Justice Field objected. He repeated his argument that a
prohibition on exclusion necessarily involved a requirement of inclusion, 9
and thus demanded more proof than just exclusion to make out a discrimination case.60
The fifth foundational decision, Bush v. Kentucky,6' followed Neal's
presumption of compliance, even in the face of two legislative reenactments
of exclusionary requirements, relying on the fact that the Kentucky Court of
Appeals had followed Strauder and declared these efforts unconstitutional.62 Consequently, Neal's indication that express rejection of Strauder by
the state legislature would rebut the presumption of compliance was not true
if the state's judicial system had recognized the equal protection requirement
established in Strauder. The Neal presumption of compliance was not
applied, however, to a grand jury empaneled prior to the state court's
declaration that Strauder prohibited statutory exclusion.63 In that situation,
the responsible public officials were presumed to have followed state law
rather than applied
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as set
64
forth in Strauder.
Of greater significance in the Bush decision, however, was the Court's
willingness to ignore proof of past exclusionary practice and to allow the
state to "start over" once that practice had been declared unconstitutional.
The effect was to look at the next case in a historical vacuum, and total
exclusion in that case was presumed simply to be the luck of the draw in an
otherwise proper system of selection. Still another barrier to enforcement
of Strauder had now been interposed. This was not the last to be heard of
the theory that after a state's jury selection practices had been declared
unconstitutional, the historical clock started again.65
Shortly thereafter Yick Wo v. Hopkins 66 was decided. Yick Wo
involved a municipal ordinance which required official permission to operate
a laundry in a wooden building. 67 Approximately 280 petitions for
permission were submitted.68 The applications of some 200 individuals,
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 408.
107 U.S. 110 (1883).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 122.
See cases cited infra notes 164, 178.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Id. at 374.

68. Id.
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"all of whom happened to be Chinese subjects," were denied. 69 The eighty
others, not Chinese subjects, received peimits. 70 Relying, in part, on Ex
parte Virginia7 and Neal v. Delaware,72 the Yick Wo Court stated,
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the Constitution.73
In an obvious application of statistical probability analysis, the Court stated
"the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for [the result] exists
except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong,
and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified. 7 4 A result that varied
so greatly from the statistically likely result under evenhanded administration
of the race-neutral ordinance was sufficient evidence of "an evil eye and an
unequal hand"05 that purposeful violation of the Equal Protection Clause
was established.
Since the actions of the state or its officials in all five of the jury
selection cases decided prior to Yick Wo involved total exclusion of blacks
from grand and petit juries, they do not necessarily reflect a separate
exception from the requirements of Washington v. Davis. 76 All of the jury
selection cases at this point involved such grossly disproportionate impact
(total exclusion) that a purpose to discriminate could be inferred in
accordance with the principle subsequently described as having been
established in Yick Wo.
2. The Prima Facie Case Comes Into Focus
This total exclusion prevailed as well in the ensuing group of jury
selection cases decided between 1896 and 1909, all but two of which
resulted in non-enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. In these cases,
the Supreme Court developed the initial procedural rules for establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination, in the course of which it created
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
72. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
73.
74.
75.
76.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
id. at 374.
Id. at 373-74.
See supra notes 12-18, 22-24 and accompanying text.
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the first deviation from standard equal protection jurisprudence, making
proof of a prima facie case more difficult.
The ability to remove state prosecutions to federal court because of
alleged racial segregation in jury selection was inferred in 1896, when the
Court stated that Section 641 applied only to "a denial of [constitutional]
rights or an inability to enforce them resulting from the Constitution or laws
of the State, rather a denial first made manifest at or during the trial of the
case. ' 77 As long as the state's constitution or statutes did not require or
permit racial exclusion, the defendant could not allege, prior to the
institution of judicial proceedings, that discrimination had been or would be
practiced if the prosecution remained in state court. Once judicial proceedings began, and the racial exclusion became evident, the appropriate
recourse was a motion to quash in state court.78
Allegations of racial exclusion, however, were not sufficient to establish79
a prima facie case, even on a motion to quash. In Smith v. Mississippi
the petitioner alleged that there had been 1300 registered colored voters in
the county and only 300 registered white voters, but that there were no
colored grand jurors.8 0 The Court denied relief, holding that allegations in
an affidavit were not proof.8" A similar result was reached in Tarrance v.
Florida2 where the denial of a motion to quash an indictment was
affirmed. Notwithstanding a petition alleging the existence of more than
1,400 colored men in the county, a large number of whom were qualified
but that none had been selected "for many years," the Court once again
stated that allegations were not proof and that the defendant had not sought
to prove the truth of his allegations.8 3 While the allegations in Tarrance,
if true, would have been sufficient to establish a prima facie case,8 4 the
defendant was required to prove, or at least offer to and be denied an
opportunity to prove their truth.
The most significant limitation developed in the turn-of-the-century
cases on establishing a prima facie case was introduced in Martin v.

77. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 581 (1896).
78. id. at 584. Interestingly, no reference was made to Ex parte Virginia and
federal statute criminalizing discrimination in jury selection upheld in that case.
79. 162 U.S. 592 (1896). Accord Pink Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S.
(1910); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 (1903).
80. Gibson, 162 U.S. at 593.
81. Id. at 592. The Smith Court distinguished Neal v. Delaware, on the ground
in Neal the State had agreed that the statements and allegations in the petition were true.
82. 188 U.S. 519 (1903).
83. Id. at 521.
84. Id. at 522.

the
161
that
Id.
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Texas85 and Thomas v. Texas.8 6 In both, the defendant alleged that onefourth of the qualified jurors of the county were persons of African descent,
87
but that none were on the grand jury which indicted the defendant.
Martin's appeal was rejected, although he had requested and was denied an
opportunity to present proof, because he had alleged only that blacks had
been intentionally excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. 88 Rather
than apply statistical probability analysis, as in Yick Wo, and concluding that
with a population twenty-five percent black, "the conclusion cannot be
resisted, that no reason for [the total absence of blacks] exists except
'
the Court
hostility to the race . . . to which petitioner[] belong[s], 89
9°
adopted Justice Field's argument in Ex parte Virginia in the following
words:
A different conclusion in this case would mean that, in a criminal
prosecution of a negro for crime, an allegation of discrimination
against the African race, because of their race, could be established by simply proving that no one of that race was on the grand
jury that returned the indictment or on the petit jury that tried the
accused; whereas, a mixed jury, some of which shall be of the
same race with the accused, cannot be demanded, as of right, in
any case, nor is a jury of that character guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 91
On similar facts in Thomas, the Court said:
[D]iscrimination in organizing a grand jury and impanelling a petit
jury cannot be established by merely proving that no one of the
defendant's race was on either of the juries, and that an accused
person cannot of right demand a mixed jury, some of which shall
be of his race, nor is a jury of that kind guaranteed by the

85. 200 U.S. 316 (1906).
86. 212 U.S. 278 (1909).

87. Martin, 200 U.S. at 318; Thomas, 212 U.S. at 279.
88. Martin, 200 U.S. at 318. In Neal v. Delaware, the Court accepted Neal's
allegations that the State had excluded "colored persons" from the juries because of their
color without requiring more proof than Neal's affidavit. Neal, 103 U.S. at 396-97.
Subsequently, in Smith v. Mississippi and Martin v. Texas the Court found that a mere
allegation without proof was insufficient. Smith, 162 U.S. at 600-01; Martin, 200 U.S. at
319-20. The Court distinguished Neal on the ground that the State in Neal had conceded that
the allegations were true. Martin, 162 U.S. at 600. On the other hand, an allegation coupled
with an offer of proof which was not permitted by the trial court was deemed sufficient.
89. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
dissenting).
90. 100 U.S. 339, 368-70 (1879) (Field, J.,
91. Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 320-21'(1906).
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92
Fourteenth Amendment to any race.
This requirement, an allegation and proof or offer of proof of longstanding discrimination, is not consistent with the conventional equal
protection doctrine established in Yick Wo. 93 The reason why both Martin
and Thomas were unsuccessful in their appeals was that they alleged and
proved statistically highly unlikely results only in the selection of their own
grand juries, not a long-standing pattern of exclusion. The Court interpreted
that as an assertion of a right to have at least some blacks on the grand
juries that indicted the defendants. 94
However, no such proof of long-standing discrimination was required
of the petitioner in Yick Wo. Indeed, although the facts are not clear, it does
appear that many, if not all, of the Chinese subjects who were denied
permits to operate laundries in wooden buildings had previously been
permitted to do so. Total exclusion in this one governmental decision was
sufficient to establish an equal protection violation in Yick Wo. Had the
Yick Wo Court adopted Justice Field's argument, as reflected in Martin and
Thomas, Yick Wo would have been resolved against petitioner because he
was asserting a non-existent constitutional right to have some persons who
were Chinese subjects operating wooden laundries.
The logic of the Martin and Thomas decisions seems superficially
acceptable. Certainly there can be no constitutional right of a litigant to
have jurors of any particular race in any particular case, nor can there be a
right of a cognizable racial group to representation on every grand jury.
However, when one considers the statistical improbability that in a
community one-fourth black no blacks would show up on a particular grand
jury, the conclusion seems necessary that "an evil eye and an unequal
hand" 95 were at work.
In only one situation during this period was the petitioner successful in
having the Equal Protection Clause applied to his case. In Carter v.
Texas,96 the defendant made the proper motion--a motion to quash.97 The
defendant alleged that blacks constituted about one-fourth of the local
population and registered voters and were qualified to serve, that there had
been no blacks on grand juries "for a great many years" 8 and that there

92.
93.
94.
(1909).
95.
96.
97.
98.

Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 282 (1909).
See supra notes 73-75.
Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 282
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
177 U.S. 442 (1900). Accord Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
Id. at 444.
Id. at 448.
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were none on his grand jury. Finally, the motion concluded with the
statement "[a]ll of which the defendant is ready to verify." 99 The trial
court refused to hear any evidence and denied the motion.
Carter had done the only thing that would be successful. In a motion
to quash the indictment, he alleged not only that no blacks sat on his grand
jury but that none had sat on any grand jury for a long period of time, and
he sought but was denied, the opportunity to prove these allegations. This
being done, no further allegation or proof of actual purposeful discrimination
was required. The focus for an equal protection/jury selection prima facie
case had been established.
3. Total Exclusion (Round 2)
Notwithstanding Carter'sdirection on the proper method of establishing
a prima facie case, total exclusion of African-Americans from jury eligibility
appears to have continued for over a generation in some states without
further challenge.'0
In the 1930s, litigants began again to institute
challenges, the first of which was presented to the Supreme Court in Norris
v. Alabama.'0 l There the petitioner complied with the requirements
established by Carter;he proceeded by motion to quash the indictment and
the trial venire, and he alleged and presented uncontradicted evidence that
in Jackson County, Alabama, where he was indicted, the twenty-one and
over male population totaled 8801, of whom 666 were black,' that there
were no blacks on the grand jury selected in his case from Jackson County
or the trial venire selected from Morgan County, 0 3 and that there had
been none for a number of years. The Court stated, "that testimony in itself
99. Id.
100. While one can only speculate as to why a generation or more passed without the
issue returning to the Supreme Court, it seems highly unlikely, in view of subsequent cases,
that fair representation. on juries had been achieved during that period, particularly in
southern states. Certainly, the history of race relations in those states during that period
suggests that fear and intimidation played a greater role in the paucity of complaints than did
official compliance with the Constitution. See generally HIROSHI FUKARAI ET AL., RACE
AND THE JURY (1993); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 524 (1994).

101. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
102. Id. at 590. The racial heterogeneity of the relevant population (RHP) was 29.8%.
S. Sidney Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960, LVI AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 325, 327 (1962).

103. The Court held that the Morgan County jury commissioners had engaged in the
"violent presumption" condemned in Neal that blacks as a group were unqualified. Norris,

294 U.S. at 587, 596-97.
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made out a primafacie case of the denial of the equal protection which the
Constitution guarantees."' 4 The Norris opinion went on:
We think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no
negro had been called for service on any jury in Jackson County,
that there were negroes qualified for jury service, that according
to the practice of the jury commission their names would normally
appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite age
but that no names of negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the
testimony with the respect to the lack of appropriate consideration
of the qualifications of negroes, established the discrimination
which the Constitution forbids.' 05
Norris thus went beyond Neal and Carter. Not only was proof of
systematic exclusion enough to establish a prima facie equal protection
violation, but so too was the failure of the government officials responsible
to give "appropriate consideration [to] qualifications of negroes."' This
suggests an affirmative action element to equal protection/jury selection
jurisprudence that the Court was to further develop.0 7
Following Norris, the Supreme Court found it necessary to declare total
exclusion invalid in Kentucky, 8 Louisiana, " Texas," 0 Mississ104. Id.at 591. Norris had an even stronger case than that. The Court went on to say
"[t]he case thus made was supplemented by direct testimony... as to the actual qualifications
of individual negroes ..... Id. at 591-92.
105. Id. at 596. Six weeks after Norris, similar evidence was found to establish an
equal protection violation in Hollin v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935).
106. Norris, 294 U.S. at 596.
107. See infra notes 170, 181.
108. Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938). The state stipulated to the truth of the
allegations in defendant's motion to set aside the indictment that there were qualified blacks
in the relevant population (over set the RHB at 4 1%), and that no black had been summoned
for jury service "for a period of fifty years or longer." Id. at 615. Nonetheless, even in light
of Strauder, Carter, and Norris, the state contested the equal protection challenge to the
fullest extent possible.
109. In Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939), the motion to quash the indictment,
the general venire, the grand jury panel and the petit jury panel was supported by witness
testimony that no negro had served on a grand or petit jury from 1896 to 1936, that one
negro had been called for jury service in 1937, that blacks constituted 25-50% of the total
population of 12,000-15,000, and that many were qualified. Id. at 359. The Court took
judicial notice of census data for 1930 showing the county approximately 50% white and
50% negro, of which about 30% of the latter were illiterate. Id. These facts were held to
establish a "strong prima facie showing." Id. at 361.
One other factor of significance in Pierre was the Court's first indication that the
equal protection principles applied to the selection of both grand and petit juries. Id. at 362.
Although this approach is not a deviation from standard equal protection jurisprudence, it is
a deviation from Sixth Amendment impartial jury analysis.
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ippi,'" North Carolina," 2 and finally, thirty-two years after Norris,
Alabama had to be reminded again."3
4. Proportionateand DisproportionateRepresentation
With the exception of the requirement of a long-standing practice, the
total exclusion cases are consistent with the Yick Wo exception identified in
Washington v. Davis." 4 The remaining jury cases, however, were not Yick
Wo cases. In these cases, there was not total exclusion. Blacks were
represented but the Court, essentially applying statistical probability
analysis, 1 5 concluded that the representation was disproportionately low
and thus constituted proof of purposeful discrimination. The first of these
cases was Smith v. Texas." 6 In Smith, the evidence demonstrated that
Negroes constituted over 20% of the population and almost 10% of the poll7
tax payers and that a minimum of 3000 to 6000 were qualified to serve."
Unlike in the total exclusion cases, however, some blacks had served over
the years. The statistics demonstrated that during the years 1931 to 1938,8
18 negroes and 494 whites had been summoned for grand jury service,"
and of these 18, five had served on grand juries out of a grand juror total

110. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). In Hill the evidence presented included the
1940 Census statistics that the relevant county had 398,564 residents, 61,605 of whom were
black and 19,133 of those being males 21 years old or more. Id. at 403. The RHP was
calculated in Hill at 52.3%. The proof also established that there were qualified negroes in
the county and that none had been called for at least 16 years. Id. at 404.
111. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947). In Patton the Census data showed an
adult colored population of 12,500 out of a total adult population of 34,821. Id. at 465. The
RHP was calculated at 92.1%. Id. The proof indicated that no Negro had served on a grand
or petit jury for 30 years or more. Id. at 464. The state supreme court had disregarded the
evidence of historical exclusion, concluding that the defendant had proved only that no one
on his particular venire list was black, and found no violation. Id. at 466. The United States
Supreme Court held "the indisputable fact that no Negro had served on a criminal court
grand or petit jury for a period of thirty years created a very strong showing that during that
period Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service because of race." Id. at 466.
112. Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948).
113. Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 (1967). It should be noted that between the
Norris and Coleman decisions, the Court upheld Alabama's peremptory challenge system that
allowed the exercise of race based discretion by a government officer. See Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
114. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
115. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 56, at 350.
116. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
117. Id. at 128-29.
118. Id. at 129. The RHP was 36%. Ulmer, supra note 102, at 327.
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of 384. l During the eight-year period studied, blacks were represented
on grand juries only five times. 20
Consequently, under the Washington v. Davis approach, Smith did not
fit into the Yick Wo total exclusion exception. It was a case, rather, in
which a showing of disparate 'impact but not total exclusion was offered to
establish a prima facie case. In another unconventional decision, this time
broadening the application of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court ignored
Yick Wo, and found a prima facie case of racial discrimination, stating
"[c]hance and accident alone could hardly have brought about the listing for
grand jury service of so few negroes from among the thousands shown by
the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications for jury
service. '
No longer was proof of total exclusion required. A result
statistically disproportionate from the relevant population ratio could not be
explained by "chance or accident," and established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in jury selection.
With the exception of peremptory challenges, the Smith approach has
been consistently followed in equal protection/jury selection cases involving
representation statistically below that of the general population. Nonetheless, it was not until 1964 that purposeful racial discrimination was held
established in North Carolina by a continuing statistical disparity between
22
blacks eligible to serve and those actually called.
The Georgia experience involved still another approach to the issue,
and one which appears to have established the current law on disproportionate impact in jury selection. The modern Georgia story began with Avery
v. Georgia,'23 where 166,000 blacks constituted twenty-five percent of a
total county population of almost 700,000. The tax list had fourteen percent
blacks (105,035 whites and 17,736 blacks). 24 The jury list for the year
in question was five percent black (20,509 whites and 1115 blacks).' 21 In
addition to these statistical disparities, the evidence indicated that the jury
list was drawn from county tax returns and printed on colored tickets,

119. Smith, 311 U.S. at 129. The RHP was 13.4%. Ulmer, supra note 102, at 327.
120. See Smith, 311 U.S. at 129.
121. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940); accord Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 482 (1954) ("[l]t taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no
members of this class [Mexican Americans] among the over six thousand jurors called in the
past 25 years. The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision
on the part of any individual jury commissioner.").
122. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964).
123. 345 U.S. 559 (1953). Accord Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
124. Avery, 345 U.S. at 563.
125. Id.
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yellow for black taxpayers and white for white taxpayers. 26
The tickets on which the potential jurors' names were written were
placed in a box from which the appointing judge drew. All tickets drawn
by the judge were white. The judge testified that he had not practiced
discrimination, and no contradictory evidence was presented. Nonetheless,
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, indicated that the color
difference in the tickets presented an opportunity to discriminate and, in
view of the results, purposeful discrimination had been established without
any further proof.'27
The "opportunity to discriminate" factor continued to play a role in
determining the validity of Georgia's jury selection process. Whitus v.
Georgia128 culminated six years of litigation over the selection of grand
and petit juries. The original conviction was overturned by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, based on a finding that 45%
of the county population was black but none had ever served on juries
within the memory of the witnesses.1 29 Thereafter the jury commissioners
revised the jury list, using tax records as required by state law. The tax
return sheets, furnished by the State, were printed on colored paper, white
for white taxpayers and yellow for negro taxpayers, and the tax digest, from
which the jury list was selected, had a "(c)" after the name of colored
taxpayers. 3 ° Although each jury commissioner testified, without contradiction, that he was unaware of the designation and had made no selection
based on race, the Court observed that 42.6% of adult males were black, that
three of thirty-three perspective grand jurors selected were black, that only
126. Id. at 560.
127. Id. at 562. Justice Reed, concurring, found the statistics alone to be sufficient, id.
at 563, and Justice Frankfurter, while finding the different colored tickets to be significant,
ultimately concluded that "[t]he stark resulting phenomenon here was that somehow or other,
despite the fact that over 5% of the slips were yellow, no Negro got onto the panel of 60
jurors from which Avery's jury was selected. The mind of justice, not merely its eyes,
would have to be blind to attribute such an occurrence to mere fortuity." Id. at 564

(Frankfurter, J., concurring).

Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955), also a mid-1950s decision, did not involve
any procedure which presented an "opportunity to discriminate." Moreover, the State offered
proof that the jury boxes had been revised the year prior to Reece's indictment. In this case,

however, the Court did not assume that revision of the method of selection of the jury lists

restarted the clock for systematic exclusion analysis. Rather, the Court looked at the
statistics over an 18-year period, saw that they were consistent with the disproportionate
representation on Reece's grand jury, but reversed his conviction on other grounds. Id. at

88.

128. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
129. Id. at 548.
130. Id. at 549.
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one had served on the nineteen-person grand jury, and that the trial venire
of ninety persons contained seven blacks, none of whom were accepted on
the petit jury. Noting the similarity of the selection system to the colored
tickets system rejected in Avery, and the disproportionate results, the Court
stated "[u]nder such a system the opportunity for discrimination was present
and we cannot say on this record that it was not resorted to by the
commissioners. Indeed, the disparity between the percentage of Negroes on
the tax digest (27.1%) and that of the grand jury venire (9.1%) and the petit
jury venire (7.8%) strongly points to this conclusion."' 3' The Whitus
decision was joined that year by Jones v. Georgia 32 in which the Court
case" and
simply compared the "salient facts in Whitus and in petitioner's
133
indistinguishable.
essentially
be
to
concluded the cases
A similar result was reached in Sims v. Georgia,'34 where Negroes
constituted 24.4% of the individual taxpayers in the county but only 4.7%
of the names on the grand jury list and 9.8% of the names on the list from
which petitioner's grand and petit juries were selected.' 35 Once again
those statistics, together with the opportunity to discriminate presented by
separate tax lists, was found to establish an equal protection violation
notwithstanding direct testimony that every qualified juror in the county was
known to at least one of the jury commissioners and that they had not
discriminated in selecting names.' 36 The principle taken from Whitus,
Jones, and Sims appears to be that a disparate impact is sufficient to prove
purposeful discrimination at least when it results from a decision-making
process that lends itself to discrimination by those of a mind to do so,
notwithstanding the absence of proof that anyone used the opportunity to
discriminate and the presence of sworn testimony by the officials exercising
the discretion that they did not consider race in their decisions.
Ultimately, in Turner v. Fouche,137 decided in 1970, after Whitus,
Jones, and Sims, a Georgia state court directed jury commissioners to38
recompose a county jury list using voter registration rather than tax lists.
From the over 2000 names on the voter list, all but 608 were eliminated for
statutorily authorized reasons such as poor health and old age, including 178

131. Id. at 552. In a footnote, the Court pointed out that the statistical probability of
the trial venire having the racial composition it did was .000006. Id. at 552 n.2.
132. 389 U.S. 24 (1967).
133. Id. at 25.
134. 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
135. Id. at 407.
136. Id.
137. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
138. Id. at 352 n.8.
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eliminated because they did not meet the statutory qualifications of being
intelligent and upright citizens.' 39 By the time this list of 608 was
narrowed down through random selection processes, the 23-member grand
jury contained only six blacks." ° Subsequent inquiry "revealed that 171
of those rejected as unintelligent or not upright were Negroes--96% of the
total removed for that reason."'' 4 By way of contrast, only 6% of those
42
individuals relieved of jury duty at their own request were black.
Although the technique used in Turner eliminated the racial identification
from tax lists that proved fatal in Whitus, Jones, and Sims, the Court
nonetheless found a still fatal combination of human discretion and
statistically unlikely results. In rejecting the constitutionality of the grand
jury impaneled in this way the Supreme Court stated:
The undisputed fact was that Negroes composed only 37% of
the . . . list from which the new grand jury was drawn. That
figure contrasts sharply with the representation that their percentage (60%) of the general ... population would have led them to
obtain in a random selection. In the absence of a countervailing
explanation by the appellees, we cannot say that the underrepresentation reflected in these figures is so insubstantial as to
warrant no corrective action by a federal court charged with the
responsibility of enforcing constitutional guarantees.
Specifically, we hold that the District Court should have
responded to the elimination of 171 Negroes out of the 178
citizens disqualified for lack of "intelligence" or "uprightness. '143
In sum, the appellants demonstrated a substantial disparity
between the percentages of Negro residents in the county as a
whole and of Negroes on the newly constituted jury list. They
further demonstrated that the disparity originated, at least in part,
at the one point in the selection process where the jury commissioners invoked their subjective judgment rather than objective
criteria. The appellants thereby made out a prima facie case of
jury discrimination, and the burden fell on the appellees to
overcome it.'"

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 357.
at 358.
n.17.
at 359.
at 360.
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Turner was followed shortly by Alexander v. Louisiana,'W reaffirming that the ability to identify the race of those affected, coupled with
disproportionate impact, is sufficient to establish an equal protection
violation, even without independent proof of discriminatory purpose.
Purposeful discrimination in jury selection is established if the decisionmaking process contains the opportunity for subjectivity in the thinking of
the decision-maker and results in disparate impact.
It thus is evident that in the area of jury selection an exercise of
discretion by a government officer coupled with a disparate impact on a
disadvantaged group is sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination
which becomes the government's obligation to rebut. If this approach were
used in other areas one might well find significantly different results. In
Washington v. Davis,'" considering disparate racial results on a police
qualifying examination, for example, governmental discretion was necessarily inherent in the creation or selection of the qualifying test, thus permitting
4 7 That factor,
"those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.''
together with the evidence that a disproportionate number of blacks were
unable to pass the test would, under jury selection analysis, lead to a finding
of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and would have placed
the burden on the government to prove the racial neutrality of the test.
Similarly, in Arlington Heights148 the discretionary decision of the zoning
board coupled with the knowledge that a denial of the zoning variation
would disproportionately affect the African American population in the area
would, under the jury selection cases, constitute sufficient evidence of
purposeful discrimination to place the burden on the government to rebut.
that that is not the approach used in areas other
We have seen, however,
49
than jury selection.
B. REBUJTTAL OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE

"[W]hen a prima facie case of discrimination is presented, the burden
falls, forthwith, upon the State to overcome it.'' ° Given the unconven-

145. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
146. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
147. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
148. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
149. See also supra text accompanying notes 12-26.
150. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 563 (1953). Accord Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545, 550 (1967) ("The burden is, of course, on the petitioners to prove the existence of
purposeful discrimination. However, once a prima facie case is made out the burden shifts
to the prosecution."). See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1939) ("Had there been
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tional ease with which a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection
can be established, the ease or difficulty of establishing an acceptable
rebuttal plays a significant role in the equal protection/jury selection
calculus.
In conventional Washington v. Davis doctrine, of course, rebuttal is
very difficult.' 5 1 Once a petitioner has proved through the evidence
demanded by Arlington Heights,'52 that the government has created a
classification for the subjective purpose of racial discrimination, proof of a
negative--that race played no role in the classification--is necessarily
unlikely.
Attempts to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection
began with Neal v. Delaware,5 3 when the State asserted widespread and
personal knowledge that no African in the State was qualified. Justice Field,
dissenting from the Neal holding that a constitutional violation had been
proved, indicated that other explanations such as merit and fitness may have
led to the result. 54 He accepted the Delaware Supreme Court's judicial
notice:
That none but white men were selected is in nowise remarkable
in view of the fact--too notorious to be ignored--that the great
body of black men residing in this State are utterly unqualified by
want of intelligence, experience, or moral integrity to sit on juries.
Exceptions there are, unquestionably, but they are rare .... With
our knowledge, as men of the State, of the African race in
Delaware, and of the circumstance just referred to it would be
wholly unwarranted in us to infer exclusion for the mere reason
of color, because our juries are, in point of fact, composed of
white men alone; or to entertain a suspicion of such cause unless
evidence obtainable to contradict and disprove the testimony offered by petitioner, it cannot
be assumed that the State would have refrained from introducing it."); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 594-95 (1935) ("The fact that the testimony [on behalf of petitioner] ... was
not challenged by evidence appropriately direct, cannot be brushed aside."); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468 (1947) ("[I]f it can possibly be conceived that all [colored
electors] were disqualified for jury service ... we do not doubt that the State could have
proved it.").
151. Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d
396, 404 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that a reason for the decision that would have been an
adequate rebuttal of a prima facie case of discrimination will not be adequate if the decisionmaker was not aware of that reason at the time of the decision); United States v. Travis, 837
F. Supp. 1386, 1395 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (holding that a rebuttal of a prima facie case requires
a demonstration of a compelling governmental interest).
152. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
153. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
154. Id. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting).
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it had better support... 155
In a sharp rejection of Justice Field's argument, the Neal majority took a
wholly different view of this state court judicial notice. The majority stated:
It was, we think, under all the circumstances, a violent presumption which the State court indulged, that such uniform exclusion
of that race from juries, during a period of many years, was solely
because, in the judgment of those officers, fairly exercised, the
of
black race in Delaware were utterly disqualified, by want
56
intelligence, experience, or moral integrity, to sit on juries.
Rebuttal rule number one had been established: The government could
not presume race to be a valid proxy for qualification for jury service, even
in the face of an honestly subjective (and possibly objectively reasonable)' 57 belief that this was an accurate assessment of the situation in the
State at that time.
After Neal, only one effort to rebut a prima facie case was made in the
foundational decisions. This attempt relied on the presumption, referred to
in Neal, that state officials complied with applicable law, a presumption
once again accepted by the Supreme Court. In Bush v. Kentucky, 5 s the
accused had been indicted by an all white grand jury, and tried by an all
white petit jury, in compliance with Kentucky law expressly limiting
eligibility for jury service to white persons. The State, in response to a
motion to set aside the indictment, argued that in the absence of evidence
of purposeful racial discrimination, it must be presumed that those selecting
jurors had complied with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as of the date of its adoption.' 59 As to the grand jury, the Supreme Court
turned the argument against the State. Pointing to the fact that twice, after
the adoption of the amendment, the Kentucky legislature had reenacted the
racial limitation, the Court held that those selecting the grand jury must be
presumed to have complied with applicable state law (instead of the
Fourteenth Amendment) and intentionally excluded non-whites from the
grand jury. °
Under the same reasoning, however, the all white petit jury which tried
defendant was not unconstitutionally selected. Prior to the selection of that
jury, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had declared the racial limitation in

155.
156.
157.
Delaware
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 402 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 397.
The Delaware Supreme Court pointed to the difficulty the federal court in
was having finding qualified black jurors. Id. at 402 (Field, I., dissenting).
107 U.S. 110 (1883).
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122.
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the Kentucky statutes to be unconstitutional and further declared that those
selecting juries must act "without regard to race or color.' 61 Moreover,
the trial judge had expressly instructed the sheriff "to proceed in his
selection without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude."1 62 Under these circumstances, the Court held, it must be presumed,
in the absence of evidence clearly and distinctly show[ing] that the officers
who selected and summoned the petit jurors excluded from the panel
qualified citizens of African descent because of their race or color, that the
sheriff had complied, not with state law, but with the requirements set forth
in the holding of the Kentucky Court of Appeals and with the instructions
of the trial judge, notwithstanding a continuation of the result of an all white
petit jury.1 63 This aspect of Bush thus established that a state court
decision, acknowledging applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment, was
sufficient to establish a presumption of compliance with constitutional
requirements without regard-to state law, the actual racial composition of the
grand or petit jury, or the history of discrimination that had preceded. This
presumption was held sufficient to rebut the extensive evidence of
discrimination, and the E4ual Protection Clause became more difficult to
enforce.
The return of the equal protection/jury selection issue to the Supreme
Court in the 1930s brought with it new efforts to rebut a prima facie case
established by statistical disparity. In Norris v. Alabama' 64 the State
sought to rebut the prima facie case through the testimony and affidavits of
the jury board:
that a list was made up which included the names of all male citizens of suitable age; that black residents were not excluded from
this general list; that in compiling the jury roll [they] did not
consider race or color; that no one was excluded for that reason;
and that [they] had placed on the jury roll the names of persons
possessing the qualifications under the statute. 65
The Court responded:
We think that this evidence failed to rebut the strong prima
facie case which defendant had made. That showing as to the
long-continued exclusion of negroes from jury service, and as to
the many negroes qualified for that service, could not be met by
mere generalities. If, in the presence of such testimony as
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 116 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509 (1880)).
Id. at 117.
Id.
294 U.S. 587 (1935).
Id. at 598.
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defendant adduced, the mere general assertions by officials of their
performance of duty were to be accepted as an adequate justification for the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the
constitutional provision--adopted with special reference to their
protection--would be but a vain and illusory requirement."6
The Norris opinion concluded that the evidence demonstrated the jury
commissioners had in fact engaged in the "violent presumption," condemned
in Neal, that blacks as a group were unqualified. 67 Indeed, even the
testimony of local judges "that they had not discriminated against Negroes
in choosing grand juries, and had only tried to pick the best available jurors"
was inadequate rebuttal under Norris.'6
Closely related to the testimonial assertion of nondiscrimination was the
claim that the jury panel had been selected from among persons known to
the commissioners, none of whom happened to be black. In Hill v.
Texas'69 the Court rejected an attempted rebuttal to defendant's prima
facie case, premised on the argument that the commissioners discussed the
issue and did not decide to exclude blacks but simply knew of no qualified
blacks. Hill held that the jury commissioners had an affirmative constitutional duty to "know or seek to learn whether there are in fact any qualified
to serve."' l 0
Still another rebuttal effort, based in the inclusion of blacks in
statistical proportion to their numbers in the relevant community, although
initially successful, was ultimately rejected. After the Texas system of
occasional, but statistically inadequate, inclusion of Negroes was struck

166. Id.
167. Similar efforts to rebut a statistical prima facie case through testimony by the jury
commissioners of nondiscrimination were rejected in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551
(1967) and Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940) (both jury commissioners "categorically
denied that they intentionally, arbitrarily or systematically discriminated against negro jurors
as such." This testimony was rebutted by no evidence other than the aforementioned
statistics demonstrating disproportionate impact). See also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
88 (1955) (testimony of clerk and deputy clerk of the court).
168. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958).
169. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
170. Hill, 316 U.S. at 404. The Court further found a constitutional duty to make an
"effort to ascertain whether there were within the county members of the colored race
qualified to serve as jurors, and if so who they were." Id.
Of course, under Yick Wo even the state court's finding of a single exercise of
discretion that resulted in no representation of a racial group that constituted 36% of the adult
population should have been enough to find an equal protection violation. The Supreme
Court did not so find, however, and emphasized the long period of time this result had
obtained.
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down in Smith v. Texas' and Hill v. Texas, 7 2 the grand jury selected
in Akins v. Texas' included one Negro. The defendant challenged his
conviction, asserting the inclusion of a single person of his race was an
arbitrary and purposeful limitation. The evidence indicated that Negroes
constituted about 15.5% of the population of the county, and the Supreme
Court calculated that, "[o]n the strictly mathematical basis of population, a
grand jury of twelve would have 1.8552 negro members on the average."' 7 4 The impossibility of having a fraction of a grand juror suggested
that one or two blacks on a grand jury would be an indication, statistically
at least, that the grand jurors were selected fairly. In Akins, the trial judge
apparently had instructed the jury commissioners that representation of
Negroes on the grand jury was required, or at least a good idea to demonstrate nondiscrimination, and the commissioners testified that they followed
that suggestion by appointing one black. 7 5 A majority of the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Reed, concluded that the
relevant period for evaluation was after the decision in Hill. In other words,
as in Bush, 7 6 Texas was permitted to start the clock running again,
notwithstanding the apparent continuation of the history of discrimination
struck down in Smith and Hill.
Moreover, pointing out that fairness was essential to proper judicial
procedure, the Court stated, "It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of
the courts disregard this accepted standard of justice."'7 7
Once again, the Court presumed that, after a long history of racial
discrimination followed by a declaration of unconstitutionality, state officials
obeyed the law:
Purposeful discrimination is not sustained by a showing that on a
single grand jury the number of members of one race is less that
that race's proportion of the eligible individuals. The number of

171. 311 U.S. 400 (1942). See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.

173. 325 U.S. 398 (1945).

174. Id. at 405.
175. Id. at 404 n.4, 406-07.
176. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883).
177. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 401 (1945). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Murphy
pointed to testimony by all three commissioners that, as individuals and without discussion
or agreement, each had decided to select one negro. Even without disproportionate impact,
therefore, Justice Murphy found actual intent to limit on the basis of color. Id. at 410. The
Court has subsequently held that testimony by a government decision-maker that the decision

was made with a consciousness of race is sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination and

an equal protection violation even under the Washington v. Davis rule. E.g., Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
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our races and nationalities stands in the way of evolution of such
a conception of due process or equal protection. Defendants under
our criminal statutes are not entitled to demand representatives of
the racial inheritance upon juries before whom they are tried. "8
Not surprisingly, after Akins state officials concluded that inclusion of a
single Negro on every grand jury panel satisfied their constitutional
obligation.
Five years later, however, this practice was returned for Supreme Court
consideration, and in Cassell v. Texas 7 9 the Texas quota system was
struck down by a 7-1 vote. The seven justices did not agree on a rationale,
however. Of primary significance for the four justices for whom Justice
Reed wrote was the continuation of the practice of ignorance condemned in
Hill. 80 The facts apparently were that because the jury commissioners
intended to appoint one black to each grand jury panel, they did not deem
it necessary to make any particular effort to get to know members of the
black community. Knowledge of one qualified black was sufficient. Justice
Reed indicated that the commissioners had failed "their duty to familiarize
themselves fairly with the qualifications of eligible jurors of the county
without regard to race or color."''
The opinion went on to say:
[D]iscrimination may be proved in other ways than by evidence
of long-continued unexplained absence of Negroes from many
panels. The statements of the jury commissioners that they chose
only who they knew, and that they knew no eligible Negroes in
an area where Negroes made up so large a proportion of the
population, prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimination
in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights.' 82
The other three justices, in an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter,
voted to reverse the conviction because of the obvious quota system being
used. These justices stated:
[If one factor is uniform in a continuing series of events that are
brought to pass through human intervention, the law would have
to have the blindness of indifference rather than the blindness of
impartiality not to attribute the uniform factor to man's pur-

178. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).

179. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).

180. Justice Reed did conclude, as well, that enough time had passed during which
grand juries in Dallas County never had more than one black, that a prima facie case of
proportional racial limitation over a period of years had been made out. Id. at 287.
181. Id. at 289.
182. Id. at 290.
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83

pose.1
Consequently, these justices could not attribute the almost perfect proportional representation to anything other than race conscious decisions and
concluded that purposeful discrimination had led to the statistically precise
but unlikely results. The question for Justice Frankfurter thus was not only
whether there was "a purposeful non-inclusion of Negroes because of race
[but also whether there was] a merely symbolic representation, not the
operation of an honest exercise of relevant judgment or the uncontrolled
caprices of chance."'84
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Cassell thus identified an additional
factor to be considered, human intervention. 8 5 When the system used
presents an opportunity for human intervention, and the results are
statistically unlikely, even if the government official is not consciously
discriminating, 8 6 "[T]he mind of justice, not merely its eyes,8 7 would have
to be blind to attribute such an occurrence to mere fortuity.".
The existence of an opportunity for human intervention played a role
in rejection of the State's attempt to rebut the defendant's statistically
demonstrated prima facie case in Avery v. Georgia' 88 and Whitus v.
Georgia.8 9 In both cases, the race of the members of the jury pool was
identifiable--in Avery through the use of different colored tickets placed in
the jury box and in Whitus though the designation "(c)" placed opposite the
names of colored jurors on the tax digest from which the pool was selected.
The evidence presented by the State, and not contradicted by the defendants,
demonstrated totally blind systems of jury selection.1 9° Nonetheless, the
Court stated in Avery, "Obviously that practice makes it easier for those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate,"' 9' and the rebuttal
attempt failed.
At this point, there are several lessons to be learned about rebuttal of
a statistically established prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury
*selection. After a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality, the presumption
concurring).
183. Id. at 293 (Frankfurter, J.,

184. Id. at 291. Accord Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471 (1953) ("Of course, token

summoning of Negroes for jury service does not comply with equal protection.").
185. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 293 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

186. Id.

187. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 564 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

188.
189.
190.
191.

345
385
See
345

U.S. 559 (1953).
U.S. 545 (1967).
id. at 548-49; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 560-61 (1953).
U.S. 559, 562 (1953). Accord Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967)

("Under such a system the opportunity for discrimination was present and we cannot say on
this record that it was not resorted to by the commissioners.").
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that state officials obey the law will rebut a prima facie case established by
disparate impact although a continuation over a period of years will destroy
that rebuttal. Testimony of nondiscrimination by state officials will not
rebut a statistically established prima facie case. An otherwise race neutral
system will not rebut a prima facie case if the state officials make no effort
to learn about eligible members of the black community, nor will uniform
representation in proportion to the numbers of blacks in the community.
Finally, uncontradicted proof of a race neutral selection procedure will not
rebut a statistically established prima facie case if the system affords an
opportunity to discriminate, even without evidence that anyone took
advantage of that opportunity.
92
Ultimately, the most significant rebuttal cases were Brown v. Allen'
and Speller v. Allen, 93 the only cases in which actual reasons, other than
race, were asserted and accepted as adequate rebuttal of a statistically
demonstrated prima facie case.
Defendant Brown was convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an
all white jury in Forsyth County, North Carolina, where blacks constituted
33.5% of the total population. Prior to 1948, the jury pool had been 2.5%
black, but in that year this disproportionate representation was declared
unconstitutional.' 94 Thereafter, the jury box was purged and a new jury
pool was created, developed through lists of those male residents 21 and
over who had paid their property or poll taxes. The following two years,
the percentage of blacks in the grand jury pools varied between 7% and
10%, and in petit jury pools between 9% and 17%. Eight of 37 persons
(21.6%) in the pool from which Brown's petit jury panel was selected were
black, and the special venire from which the jury was chosen reduced the
number to 3 of 20 (15%). Challenges,,peremptory and for cause, eliminated
those three. 95
No challenge was made to the manner in which the petit jurors were
selected, but Brown contended that the use of tax lists to develop the pool
necessarily resulted in an underrepresentation of blacks in the pool, and
sought a determination that all males 21 and older should have been eligible.
Rejecting this demand, the Court 'stated, "States should decide for themselves the quality of their juries as best fits their situation so long as the
classifications have relation to the efficiency of the jurors and are equally

192. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

193. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

194. Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948).
195. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 469 (1953). The significance of the use of race as
grounds for a peremptory challenge will be discussed infra.
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administered."'" Limiting jury service to those who had paid property or
poll taxes was related to the efficiency of the jurors and was equally
administered.
In a companion case, Speller v. Allen, 9 ' a similar system was used
in Vance County, North Carolina. Here, however, the list of individual
taxpayers was 38% black, but the jury box established from that list was
only 7% black. The Supreme Court indicated:
This disparity between the races would not be accepted by this
Court solely on the evidence of the clerk of the commissioners
that he selected names of citizens of "good moral character and
qualified to serve as jurors, and who had paid their taxes." It
would not be assumed that in Vance County there is not a much
larger percentage of Negroes with qualifications of jurymen.'9
In other words, the statistical disparity necessary for a prima facie case was
present.
In his rebuttal testimony the clerk went further, however. He also
stated that he had selected from the list, for inclusion in the jury box, those
with "the most property."' 99 The Court described this as "an economic
basis [which] might well account for the few Negroes appearing in the
box. ' '200 Again, it apparently was within the constitutional power of the
State to conclude that wealth bore a "relation to the efficiency of the
jurors ' ' 2 and the Court concluded, "Disregarding, as we think we should,
the clerk's unchallenged selections based on taxable property, there is no
evidence of racial discrimination. "202
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 473.
344 U.S. 443, 477 (1953).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 472.
344 U.S. 443, 482 (1953). In dissent, Justices Black and Douglas argued:
The foregoing evidence does show a partial abandonment of the old
discriminatory jury practices--since 1949 a small number of Negroes have
regularly been summoned for jury duty. But proof of a lesser degree of
discrimination now than before 1949 is insufficient to show that impartial
selection of jurors which the Constitution requires. Negroes are about onethird of Forsyth County's population. Consequently, the number of
Negroes now called for jury duty is still glaringly disproportionate to their
percentage of citizenship. It is not possible to attribute either the pre-1949
or the post-1949 disproportions entirely to accident. And the state has not
produced evidence to show that the partial continuation of the long-standing
failure to use Negro jurors is due to some cause other than racial discrimination. * * * Certainly discriminatory results remained.
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Brown and Speller thus established an important standard for evaluating
the acceptability of an asserted rebuttal of a prima facie case built on
disparate impact--the assertion of an explanation that involved a characteristic related to the efficiency of the jury, administered equally. The fact that
this explanation fell disproportionately heavily upon a previously unconstitutionally excluded racial group did not render it racially discriminatory.2 3
C. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

To this point, this analysis of jury selection cases has been limited to
the selection of grand jurors or to the selection of the venire panels from
which grand or petit jurors are chosen. In 1964, however, Swain v.
Alabama2" added the issue of racially motivated peremptory challenges
in choosing the actual petit jurors.
Swain involved a claim that while general jury selection processes at
work did not wholly exclude blacks, they did reduce their number to the
point that the prosecutor was able to use peremptory challenges to eliminate
the remainder. The defendant argued that this procedure as a whole resulted
in no black having served on a petit jury since about 1950.
Rather than consider the venire selection by the jury commissioners and
the petit jury selection by the prosecutor as a single state-operated process,
the Swain Court dealt with them as separate processes. As to the venire
panel the Court found that "the overall percentage disparity has been small,
and reflects no studied attempt to include or exclude a specified number of
Negroes."2 5 The system, in general, was "haphazard" and "imperfect" but
not "equivalent to purposeful discrimination. "' 2 6
Turning to the peremptory challenge process, the Court indicated that
generalized judgments about persons possessing group characteristics were
part of the system of peremptory challenges.2 7 That being so, the striking
of all members of a particular group, even a racial group, in a particular
case was presumed to be a part of trial strategy rather than racial discrimination and thus not subject to equal protection control.20 8 Swain thus

Id. at 550-51 (Black, J., dissenting).
203. Eleven years after Brown the Court reexamined the continued disparate impact of
the North Carolina system and, in a per curiam opinion, declared the system unconstitutional.
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
204. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
205. Id. at 209.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 220-21.
208. Id. at 221-22.
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adopted the "violent presumption" rejected by Neal v. Delaware29 to the
effect that every member of a particular racial group could be disqualified
based solely on racial assumptions, at least in a particular case.210 The
presumption was permissible because the Equal Protection Clause simply did
not apply to the strategic exercise of peremptory challenges.
This presumption, however, if made in many cases, would implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
If the state has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any
jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor
may well be overcome. Such proof might support a reasonable
inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly
unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the
peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right
and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice
enjoyed by the white population.1
The Court thus adopted the "over a period of time',2 12 approach that
distinguished cases like Carter and Norris, where an equal protection
violation was found, from Martin and Hill where exclusion or limitation in
a single case did not prove purposeful racial discrimination.
The requirement of racial disparity in more than a single case rendered
the Swain holding unenforceable, of course. Without records of peremptory
challenges, which were not available, long term proof was impossible. If
the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to individual instances of "violent
presumption," it did not apply to the peremptory challenge at all. If that
was true, it was the Equal Protection Clause, not the peremptory challenge,
that was "set aside., 213 Nonetheless, Swain did offer insight into what
would rebut a prima facie case, should one ever be established. Adopting
the "relevance" requirement expounded in Brown v. Allen, 2 4 and in Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in Cassell v. Texas,2 5 the Court stated that a
by "reasons wholly unrelated to the
peremptory strike could not be justified
216
outcome of the particular case.
Approximately twenty years later, in Batson v. Kentucky,2 7 the Court

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

103 U.S. 370 (1880).
Swain, 380 U.S. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 227.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953).
339 U.S. 282, 292 (1950).
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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overruled Swain and reestablished the applicability of the Constitution to the
peremptory challenge. Noting that "peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate,""'2 8 the Batson court held that a prima facie case of racial
discrimination would be established when "relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the [government] used that [peremptory challenge] practice to
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. '"9
The Equal Protection Clause now applied to all of jury selection, and
disparate impact, coupled with the obvious opportunity to discriminate,
could be a "relevant circumstance" sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination in a peremptory challenge.
Turning to rebuttal of the prima facie case, the Court, in Batson, listed
two explanations that would not suffice: assumption or intuitive judgment
that a juror would be partial because of shared race, 220 and affirmations of
good faith and nondiscrimination.2 2' On the other hand, as Swain had
indicated, the Brown v. Allen "relevance" requirement applied: "[O]nce a
prima facie case is established, [t]he prosecutor... must articulate a neutral
explanation related to the particular case to be tried. 222
Following Batson, several cases expanded the Equal Protection Clause's
limitation on peremptory challenges. Batson applied to civil litigants 223
and criminal defendants,2 24 white defendants had standing to assert the
rights of excluded African-American jurors, 225 and the applicability of
Batson was extended beyond race to gender. 226 The supremacy of the
Equal Protection Clause over the opportunity to discriminate offered by the
peremptory challenge seemed to be clearly reestablished.
The last half decade, however, has seen two decisions using the rebuttal
stage to impose new limitations on the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause. These limitations arguably have swung the pendulum back to
supremacy of the freedom of the challenge and may reinfuse into the system
challenges based in fact on impermissible racial and gender assump-

218.
219.
220.
221.
U.S. 625,
222.
223.

Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97. Cf.Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
632 (1972)).
Id. at 98.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).

224. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).

225. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
226. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994). As will be seen in Part
III, however, this-last expansion was not without a price in conventional jurisprudence.
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tions.2"
The first of these decisions, Hernandez v. New York,228 questioned the
racial neutrality of a challenge explained by the ability of the excluded juror
to speak a foreign language in which many of the witnesses would testify,
and that juror's hesitation before giving assurances that he would try to
accept the interpreter's version of the testimony. Affirming the trial court's
conclusion that this explanation was race neutral, Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion stated:
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here
means an explanation based on something other than the race of
the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial
validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason
offered will be deemed race neutral.229
Proceeding even further, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion interpreted
Batson as requiring only that the prosecutor's reason for striking a juror not
be the juror's race [but not] that the justification be unrelated to race.230
In the second case, Purkett v. Elem,231' defendant's prima facie case
of racial discrimination 23 2 was met by an explanatory rebuttal based on the
presence of facial hair. The State Court of Appeals found that the "state's
explanation constituted a legitimate 'hunch'. 23 3 On habeas corpus review,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, indicating that the
rebuttal consisted of "factors which are facially 2 4 irrelevant to the question of whether that person is qualified to serve as a juror in the particular
case. "235 Applying the "relevancy" requirement from Batson, the Court of
Appeals demanded "some plausible race-neutral reason for believing that
those factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her
duties as a juror."
The United States Supreme Court, in what has been described by Yale

227. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially
Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994).
228. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
229. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy did not say the reason
would be race neutral, but merely that it would be "deemed" such.
230. Id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995).
232. Although the trial court did not find a prima facie case, the State did not deny its
existence in the Supreme Court. Id. at 1773 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 1770 (quoting State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
234. Pun probably intended.
235. Id. at 1770 (quoting Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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Kamisar as "the most jolting criminal procedure case of the year,"236
criticized the lower court for "seiz[ing]" on the Batson relevance language.23 That language, the Court explained, was intended only to "refute
the notion" that denials of discriminatory motive or affirmations of good
faith might still be acceptable race neutral explanations, 28 although these
explanations, of course, were expressly rejected in Batson before exposition
of the "relevancy" requirement.239
According to the Court, the correct interpretation of Batson's "legitimate reason" requirement for rebuttal was "not a reason that makes sense,
but a reason that does not deny equal protection. ''21 Illustrations of
nonsensible reasons that could be found not to deny equal protection, the
Court indicated, were the "implausible or fantastic," the "silly or superstitious, '' 2 1 as long as "a discriminatory intent is [not] inherent in the

prosecutor's explanation. 242 The error the Court of Appeals made was
just
in "requiring that the justification tendered at the [rebuttal] step be not
'plausible'." 243
neutral but also at least minimally persuasive, i.e ....
The effect of the rules announced in Hernandez and Purkett is yet to
be fully seen. 24 At their extreme, they could effectively undo Batson by
236. 58 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1113 (1995).

237. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). The Eighth Circuit in fact quoted
Batson: "The explanation was not 'related to the particular case to be tried.'" Id. at 1773
(quoting Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 98 (1986))).
Defending the action of the Court of Appeals, Justice Stevens replied to the
majority's admonition, "Of course, they 'seized on' that point because we told them to."
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 n.8 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1771.
239. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
240. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995).
241. Id. at 1771.
242. Id.

243. Id.
244. Some courts, even before Purkett, were fairly accepting of explanations. United
States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1993) (intuition that struck venireperson could
be a follower); United States v. Viosezhoke, 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993) (black venireperson, as an apartment dweller of modest means in a predominantly black community, "may
be involved in a drug situation where she lives."); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456
(5th Cir. 1993) (venireman was a school bus driver and probably worked only part-time for
law wages); Dunham v. Frank's Nursery and Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1992)
(venireperson had same occupation as an already seated juror); United States v. Williams,
936 F.2d 1243 (11th Cir. 1991) (venireperson's residence in the same neighborhood as
persons successfully prosecuted by same prosecutor five years earlier); United States v.
Cloyd, 819 F.2d 836 (8th Cir. 1987) (venireperson's familiarity with the place defendant was
expected to claim was his alibi location); People v. Allen, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. 1995)
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permitting attorneys to stockpile rote justifications known to be acceptable
as race neutral to particular judges.24 On the other hand, judges can
examine facially race neutral reasons with care, as some have, 24 to protect
against pretexts for purposeful discrimination. At this point, however, at
least with regard to the peremptory challenge, it would appear the Court has
moved from preference for the challenge, quickly through preference for the
Equal Protection Clause, and back to preference for the challenge.
III. OF GENDER AND BLUE EYES

Peremptory challenges are by their nature "exercised without a reason
247
stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control.'
As such they fit precisely into that category of government decisions
rejected in Turner v. Fouche,248 in that a substantial disparity between the
percentage of individuals with a certain trait or characteristic on the venire
(male venireperson was not sufficiently assertive); State v. Harris, 647 N.E.2d 893 (Ill. 1994)
(lack of sufficient information, notwithstanding failure to use available opportunity to gain
information); Singo v. State, 437 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. 1993) (multiple, inconsistent reasons can
all be neutral); State v. Geddis, 437 S.E.2d 31 (S.C. 1993) (application of prosecutor's
blanket rule against young women to a black venireperson but not two twenty-year-old white
women because the white women seemed interested in the trial); Evans v. State, 458 S.E.2d
665 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (counsel desired to reach persons on the bottom of the jury list);
State v. Mickle, 1996 WL 135107 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1996) (male venirepersons failed
to make eye contact with prosecutor, who concluded they looked like individuals who would
use violence against their children).
245. Ogletree, supra note 227, at 1099.
246. United States v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187 (7th Cir. 1993) (white jurors cannot
understand the nature of the relationship between white police and black citizens of the City
of Chicago); United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1993) (female venireperson
struck "[b]ecause she was a single female ... and given the defendant's good looks would
be attracted to the defendant"); United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1993)
(counsel's intuition alone with no explanation of the basis for that intuition); Jones v. Ryan,
987 F.3d 960 (3rd Cir. 1993) (venireperson had children the same age as defendant's children
and attorney's intuitive feeling from venireman's posture and lack of receptivity); Congdon
v. State, 424 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1993) (black jurors who lived in a town where county sheriff
was disliked by most citizens); People v. Johnson, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 (Cal. App. 1996)
(inference that juror would be unattentive based on failure to make eye contact with
prosecutor during voir dire); Parker v. State, 464 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (demeanor
and body language); People v. Rodney, 596 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (black
venirepersons struck because they had no children, although childless white venirepersons
accepted, and black venirepersons did not fit counsel's "prototype" of a juror she would
seek).
247. Id. at 220 (citing State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1949)).
248. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
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panel and on the jury "originate[s] .. .at the one point in the selection
process where the [government officer] invoked [his] subjective judgment
rather than objective criteria."24 9
In light of this, Chief Justice Burger, in his Batson dissent, argued that
the majority's use of "unadulterated equal protection" was inappropriate. 2 °
The Chief Justice explained that the nature of the peremptory challenge was
that it was "'an arbitrary and capricious right. ' ' 25' He stated:
In short it is quite probable that every peremptory challenge could
be objected to on the basis that, because it excluded a venireman
[sic] who had some characteristic not shared by the remaining
members of the venire, it constituted a 'classification' subject to
equal protection scrutiny.252
The minimum scrutiny of classifications under equal protection doctrine
requires that state action that discriminates on any basis be rationally related
to a legitimate end. Because the peremptory challenge historically may
legitimately be based on a hunch, it could not survive rational basis
scrutiny."' Further, Burger argued, because the challenge is so often
based on unfounded stereotypes, equal protection will almost always be
violated.254
In developing equal protection doctrine in the cases discussed in Part
II, the Supreme Court had no need to progress beyond a determination that
the exclusionary or limiting results were caused intentionally. In all but one
of the cases, both the complaining party and the excluded jurors were
African-American,255 and just four years after adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and seven years before Strauder v. West Virginia, 256 the Court
had declared that the Equal Protection Clause was "clearly a provision for
that race." 257 The "violent presumption" rejected in Neal v. Delaware258 -that African-Americans as a group were not qualified to serve as jurors--

249. Id. at 360.
250. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
251. Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)) (quoting Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).

252. Id.

253. Id. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 120.
255. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), both the defendant and jurors
were Latinos. Another exception is Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), in which the
defendant was a white state official being prosecuted under federal law for having
discriminated against blacks in the selection of juries.
256. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
257. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).

258. 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880).
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rendered unnecessary any analysis of the classification to determine whether
there was an acceptable justification. Consequently, once purposeful
discrimination against blacks in jury selection was established, a violation
of the equal protection rights of both the complaining party and the potential
jurors clearly followed.
Had the Court engaged in modem conventional equal protection
analysis the result would have been no different. That analysis requires that
a classification purposely drawn along racial lines requires a governmental
goal that is compelling." 9 Clearly in the general exclusion cases as well
as the quota and underrepresentation cases no compelling governmental goal
was met by making jutry selection decisions along racial lines, particularly
to the disadvantage of that racial group for the protection of whom the
clause was adopted.
When the issue turned to peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky," the same result was reached. The peremptory challenge, although
an important part of the design of the American judicial system, was not of
constitutional magnitude and thus not a compelling necessity of that
system.26' Under conventional doctrine, therefore, no compelling governmental interest was demonstrated and the racial classification failed.
Jury selection classification on the basis of gender, however, experienced a very different history. Until 1994 there was no true equal
protection doctrine on this issue, and well into the current century total
exclusion of women from the jury process was tacitly or expressly (in
dictum) approved.262
That is not to say that the issue went wholly unaddressed. In 1946,
relying on its power of supervision over the administration of justice in the
federal courts, the Supreme Court in Ballard v. United Stales263 rejected
intentional and systematic exclusion of women as grand and petit jurors in
federal trials. The decision's rationale was straight-forward:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community
made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence of one on the

259. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).

260. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson overruled Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
in which the Court in effect held that in a particular case the ability to exercise peremptory
challenges to exclude African-Americans was sufficiently compelling to justify the practice.
261. Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring).
262. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947). Although the Court recognized
the changing rights and responsibilities of women, the Fay Court stated that the Constitution
does not require verdicts "rendered by juries unleavened by feminine influence." Id. at 290.

263. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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other is among the imponderables.26 4
Nonetheless, in its first opportunity to directly address the equal
265 the
protection implications of exclusion of women, in Hoyt v. Florida,
Court applied rational basis scrutiny 2' and concluded that a woman's role
"as the center of home and family life '267 was a legitimate and rational
justification for the limitation. Fourteen years later, however, applying Sixth
Amendment representative cross-section of the community analysis, Taylor
v. Louisiana2" struck down an almost identical system. Although the
Taylor court distinguished Hoyt because it was a Fourteenth rather than a
Sixth Amendment decision,269subsequent reference has indicated that Taylor
"in effect" overruled Hoyt.
By the time the Court returned to gender classifications in the jury
selection process, conventional equal protection doctrine had changed. In
a series of decisions in the 1970s the Court recognized that women had
suffered many of the same disadvantages and disabilities as had AfricanAmericans.270 The stakes were raised and gender classifications could be
supported only when the classification was substantially related to an
important government interest, 271 a somewhat less demanding standard
than that applied to race, but more demanding than the rational basis
approach followed in Hoyt. Under this standard, practices that limited
female eligibility for grand and petit jury venires obviously could no longer
stand. The Sixth Amendment requirement that an accused have the right to
select a jury from a representative cross-section of the community clearly
surpassed the importance of fostering the role of women as homemaker,
wife and mother, and certainly outweighed as well the administrative
convenience of extending the limitation to unmarried childless working
women.

2 72

Once the process moved to selection of the individuals to serve on the
actual jury to try the accused, however, the equal protection analysis became
less clear. The Sixth Amendment representative cross-section requirement

264. Id. at 193.
265. 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (holding women exempt from jury service unless they
volunteered to serve, which resulted in almost all male juries). Id.
266. Id. at 61.
267. Id. at 62.
268. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
269. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.1 (1991).
270. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). See also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
271. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
272. Id.
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does not apply to the petit jury itself,2 73 nor is an accused entitled to have
on the petit jury persons from any particular race or gender.274 At the
point at which peremptory challenges were exercised it was not self-evident
that exclusion of women qua women did not meet the applicable standard
of review.
Although the peremptory challenge is not constitutionally mandated and
thus not a compelling state interest (in that a fair trial before the impartial
jury required by the Sixth Amendment is possible without making
peremptory challenges available), it is not at all an obvious conclusion that
the peremptory challenge is not an important part of the process by which
impartial juries are selected. History demonstrates that the peremptory
challenge has a long pedigree dating to the institution of the modern jury
itself. 275 Every American jurisdiction provides for the practice, although
not constitutionally mandated to do so. This long and widespread use
certainly suggests that every American sovereign considers the opportunity
to strike a potential juror based on assumptions about group thinking to be
an important part of the jury selection process, an importance which has
taken on even greater meaning with the expanded community knowledge
brought about by the development of communication technology and the
First Amendment protection for the dissemination of information about the
judicial system, including a specific trial.276
Moreover, the very arguments advanced in Ballard, and adopted in
Taylor, for mandating that women be eligible for the pool from which the
petit jury is selected support the assertion that a litigant should have the
ability to strike potential jurors along gender lines. The petit jury is not and
cannot be a representative cross-section of the community. It is, rather, a
body of citizens, selected from a government-established pool, chosen by the
litigants in a way that (they think) best enhances the likelihood that
individuals who they assume are disinclined to be receptive to their position
do not sit on their jury. An example is J.E.B. v. Alabama,277 a paternity
and child support action. The State, maintaining the action on behalf of the
mother and child, clearly believed that women would be more receptive to
its case and used 90% of its challenges to strike men.2 78 The defendant,

273. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990).
274. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
275. I SIR JAMES F. STEPHEN, A

(1883).

HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND,

276. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

277. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
278. Id. at 1422.

301-02
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on the other hand, used all but one of his strikes against women. 9
Both parties very evidently believed that the Supreme Court was correct
in Ballard and Taylor. In Ballard, the Court stated that "[TJhe two sexes
are not fungible. 280 The "subtle interplay of influence of one on the other
is among the imponderables."2 8' It would seem, therefore, that in some
cases the gender of a juror would bear a close and substantial relationship
to the interplay of influence that a juror would bring to issues such as
paternity and child support. The point is that the process of selecting a petit
jury can work in exactly the opposite direction from the selection of the
venire. In the latter, it is important that each litigant have a range of
persons from whom to select. In the former the litigant is given the
opportunity to select a jury as single-minded as he or she can achieve. In
any particular case it may be very important to a litigant to minimize as
much as possible the "subtle interplay of influence ''282 one gender brings
to bear upon the other. As a consequence the very differences between men
as a group and women as a group, recognized for Sixth Amendment
purposes in Taylor, would be differences long accepted as a basis for
choosing not to have one or the other on a particular jury.
The J.E.B. opinion, however, did not engage in this conventional equal
protection analysis, aside from one footnote 213 in which it stated its
conclusion "that gender-based peremptory challenges are not substantially
related to an important governmental objective. "28 The Court demanded
rather "an exceedingly persuasive justification '285 for the classification,
language which sounds much closer to "compelling" than "important". The
J.E.B. Court then ignored centuries of universal judgment that the availability of peremptory challenges is substantially related to the selection of an
impartial jury, concluded that it was not, and prohibited gender-based
peremptories.
It is important to note, however, that the J.E.B. decision was not wrong.
It was, rather, a recognition that "gross generalizations that would be
deemed impermissible if made on the basis of race are [also impermissible]
when made on the basis of gender. ' 28 6 One can consider here a lunch

279. Id.
280. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946). "A community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both." Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1426 n.6 (1994).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1425.
286. Id. at 1427.
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counter analogy. Whatever may be conventional equal protection doctrine,
telling a women that her gender cannot constitutionally justify denial of
service at the court house lunch counter, but can constitutionally justify
denial of the opportunity to serve on a jury in the court room upstairs,
simply makes no sense.
It was argued by the State in Swain v. Alabama287 that the preemptory challenge system "provides justification for striking any group of
otherwise qualified jurors in any given case, whether they be Negroes,
Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes. 2 8
Canvassing the
position. 219
this
in
"merit
found
Court
the
subject,
the
on
authorities
Blackstone described the peremptory challenge as "an arbitrary and
capricious species of challenge.., grounded on ... sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices [exercisable against a potential juror regarding
whom the party] has conceived a prejudice even without being able to
assign a reason for such his dislike. 0'29 The challenge has also been
described as "'visionary and fanciful,' ' 29 ' as a process that "permits
rejection for a real or imagined partiality, '292 and "exercised on grounds
'
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action."293
The
Swain court consequently concluded that "the challenge, pro tanto, would
no longer be peremptory [if] open to examination," 294 and that "the
striking of Negroes [and presumably persons with blue eyes] in a particular
2 95
case is [not] a denial of equal protection of the laws.
The Batson Court, in rejecting Swain's permission to strike AfricanAmericans based on "associations," 296 recognized that the peremptory
challenge was normally based on "assumption" and "intuitive judgment,, 297 but held that shared race was not a permissible ground for such
assumption and judgment. The same result probably would apply to

287. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
288. Id. at 212.
289. Id.
290. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353. It appears that Blackstone's
description of the peremptory challenge as an exercise in prejudice was first accepted by the
United States Supreme Court in Justice Story's opinion in United States v. Marchant &
Colson, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 482 (1827).
291. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
292. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S.
68, 70 (1887)).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 222.
295. Id. at 221.
296. Id. at 220 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
297. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 76, 97 (1986).
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Catholics and possibly accountants. But the irony of Batson is that the
29 exercise,
peremptory challenge, in its normal "arbitrary and capricious""
necessarily fails the easiest to satisfy level of equal protection review--that
the government's classification be rationally related to a legitimate end.
Surely no one can provide a rational basis for assuming that all persons with
blue eyes think alike, and yet the ability to make that assumption is what the
peremptory challenge is all about. It is "frequently exercised on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action,"2 and
if subject to conventional equal protection analysis cannot survive.
This difficulty with rational basis equal protection analysis was at the
heart of Chief Justice Burger's dissent inBatson. Pointing out the arbitrary
and capricious nature of the peremptory challenge, °° the Chief Justice
chides the Batson majority for ignoring the conventional equal protection
30
framework for examining the validity of government classifications. '
This argument obviously makes sense. Although the Supreme Court
has not, for over a half century, rejected a government classification under
a cn
rational basis scrutiny, 3021it has
consistently stated that government
classifications may not be irrationally or arbitrarily drawn.30 3 Yet it is well

298. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
299. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
300. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("a clause
that requires a minimum 'rationality' in government actions has no application to 'an
arbitrary and capricious right."'). "It is called a peremptory challenge, because the prisoner
may challenge peremptorily on his own dislike, without showing of any cause." (quoting H.
JOY, ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF JURORS I, (1844) (emphasis added)).
301. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124-25 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See
also id. at 135-37 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
302. The one exception was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), subsequently
overruled by New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
The Supreme Court's high level of deference to legislative judgments under rational
basis review does not necessarily mean a continuation of that practice. Cf United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) (rejecting Congress' judgment that carrying firearms in
schools substantially affects interstate commerce).
303. Heller v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993) (even the standard of rationality must find
some footing in the realities of the subject addressed); Federal Communications Commission
v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2096 (1993) (social and economic classifications
must be supported by a "reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification"); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 499 U.S. 166
(1980) (stating that the question under rational basis review is whether the government
"achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way"); Borden Farm Products Co.
v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 263 (1936) (limiting judicial inquiry to whether the classification
"so lacks any reasonable basis as to be arbitrary"); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277
U.S. 389, 402 (1928) ("In no view can the [classification] be held to have more than an
arbitrary basis"); Lindsley v. Natural Carbolic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (the Equal
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well accepted that the peremptory challenge is precisely that--an arbitrary
Under
and capricious decision based on prejudice and assumption.
conventional equal protection doctrine therefore, striking all blue eyed jurors
is invalid and the peremptory challenge is thus unconstitutional whenever
exercised based on assumption, prejudice, or caprice.
The Batson majority having limited its holding to the facts before it-racially motivated peremptory challenges--found it unnecessary to address
this dilemma but, as with gender classifications, the blue eyed classification
was lurking. The solution however was not difficult. The Court simply
adopted Chief Justice Burger's view that conventional equal protection
doctrine was not being, or to be, applied to the peremptory challenge. In
J.E.B. v. Alabama304 the Court declared:
Our conclusion that litigants may not strike potential jurors solely on
the basis of gender, does not imply the elimination of all peremptory
challenges. Neither does it conflict with a State's legitimate interest in
using such challenges in its effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.
Parties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable
than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for
bias. Parties may also exercise their peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to
'rational basis" review. 0 5
The J.E.B. Court thus simply declared, without any doctrinal support,
a principle of jury selection/equal protection doctrine: challenges based on
assumptions of group thinking among groups typically or traditionally
subject to stereotyping are unconstitutional notwithstanding the body of
doctrine holding that the justification for gender discrimination need not rise
to the level of importance as that offered for racial discrimination;
challenges based on arbitrary and capricious judgments about group thinking
with regard to all other classifications are valid notwithstanding the body of
doctrine holding that governmental classifications may never be arbitrary.
CONCLUSION

In establishing equal protection doctrine in the area of jury selection,
the Supreme Court has faced a difficult choice of options. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly applies to jury

Protection Clause "admits of a wide scope of discretion ...

and avoids what is done only

when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.")
304. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
305. Id. at 1429 (1994).
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selection, and the Court so declared at its first opportunity. At the same
time, deference to state selection procedures has led the Court to raise a
number of barriers to enforcement of the clause. In the context of race, it
ultimately concluded that a numerical result different than would be
expected through statistical analysis, coupled with a step in the procedure
that offered the opportunity to discriminate, was sufficient to establish a
prima facie .case of an equal protection violation, and that rebuttal must
include a reason related to the ability of the excluded individuals to serve
properly as jurors. In the context of gender, on the other hand, the Equal
Protection Clause was held not to preclude exclusion of women, at least
until overruled in a Sixth Amendment case.
When these issues were raised in the context of peremptory challenges,
the Court faced an especially difficult task. The peremptory challenge has
a long pedigree and is almost universally considered to be an important,
though not constitutionally required, part of fair jury selection. On the other
hand, the peremptory challenge certainly offers an opportunity to discriminate, and a statistical difference in result would, in other jury selection
contexts, implicate the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.
In resolving the problems created by the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause to a government practice which historically contained the
opportunity for subjective decisions, the Court has shifted from protection
of equal treatment to protection of discretion, and back, several times. In
the general jury selection process, there now seems to be closure. Disparate
results achieved through a procedure that permits discretion will establish a
prima facie case, with regard to gender as well as race, which can be
rebutted only by a race or gender neutral explanation related to the juror's
ability to serve. This approach prevails in no other significant area of equal
protection jurisprudence."3 6
Closure certainly is not the way to describe current doctrine regarding
the peremptory challenge. In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has
shifted from protection of the challenge to protection of equality to a
somewhat confused state. As to one issue, the Court now disregards
traditional equal protection doctrine in a way that furthers both the equality
principle and the discretion inherent in the peremptory challenge. Racial
and gender-based strikes are invalid; arbitrary strikes of members of groups
doctrinally subject only to rational basis review are subject to no review.
As to the other issue, the Court appears at the moment to have adopted
unconventional equal protection jurisprudence clearly favoring the retention

306. The decision in Yick Wo does appear to be another exception, but the Court
apparently has not been presented with a Yick Wo fact pattern in over a century.
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of discretion over the protection against unequal treatment. Although the
Court has continued traditional equal protection/jury selection doctrine (but
not traditional equal protection doctrine applicable to any other issue)
regarding the establishment of a prima facie case, it has disregarded
traditional equal protection/jury selection doctrine by accepting, as race
neutral, reasons wholly unrelated to the juror's ability to perform his or her
responsibilities, so long as the reason is not inherently race-based. Further,
in determining whether a reason is inherently race-based, the Court requires
that the reason be more than one that is highly related to race or gender. It
must be race or gender.

